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On Legal Autonomy
by Stanley Fish*
I am going to talk about a topic that I have been writing on recently-legal autonomy, or more generally, disciplinary autonomy. Is it
the case that we can talk coherently about something like the discipline
of law or the discipline of literary criticism? And when we do talk about a
discipline as having some sense of autonomy, of distinctiveness, what do
we mean? What kind of distinctiveness is it? What is its source? Is it a
distinctiveness that is historically achieved or does it have a more exalted
origin in divinity or in "the nature of things"? These are the questions I
would like to raise, and I want to start by quoting a sentence from Robert
Bork's The Tempting of America.' It comes in two parts. The first part of
the sentence is, "Constitutional philosophies always have political results
.... "' The second part of the sentence reads "they should never have
political intentions . . . ."s Now, first of all let me say that I think that
the sentence in its two parts is absolutely on the mark and will reward
analysis.
What does Judge Bork mean when he says that constitutional philosophies always have political results? Well, I think he means something like
the following: when as a judge or a lawyer you argue a case or craft an
opinion the resources you think to employ will include a set of definitions,
a number of basic distinctions, and a sense of the general point of the
particular branch of law you are working in. I do not mean that these are
resources you reach for; rather, they are presupposed by you and they
must be in place before you begin, for in the absence of their having been
presupposed, beginning would not even be possible. Bork's point, as I understand it, is that not all legal actors will begin with the same presuppositions. It is always possible for some other lawyer or judge as well
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credentialed as you are to have decided the questions that must be decided before you begin differently. And that difference will tell in the outcome: take two judges, set before them the same case and, with the help
of equally legitimate legal materials, notions and distinctions, they will
produce differing and, in some cases, opposing opinions. The results of
their deliberations will vary with the assumptions within which they
move; and since those assumptions are disputable, the results of their deliberations will be political. That is what "political" means: a course of
action that follows from a point of origin not everyone will have chosen,
where choice is necessary because no god has spoken. Since no god has
pronounced on matters of constitutional philosophy, constitutional philosophies will always have political results.
Nevertheless, as Bork goes on to say, they should never have political
intentions. That is, while two or more judges faced with a legal question
may in good conscience answer it differently, it will be a legal question
they attempt to answer, not a political one. As they go about their business, they will be asking what disposition of this case will best satisfy the
requirements of justice, and not what disposition of this case will best
further the agenda of the Republican party or best advance the cause of
labor unions or the cause of corporations. The difference between reaching political conclusions and beginning with political intentions is that if
you are doing the second, you are not really doing a job of legal work.
Instead, you are pretending to do a job of legal work. You are using legal
materials, resources, assumptions, distinctions as a mask for a project you
are hiding, and that, Judge Bork says, is wrong. It is wrong because you
are being insincere and hypocritical, which are, of course, moral judgements and surely relevant; but for me the more relevant judgement is
that you are not being appropriately professional, not doing your job, not
acting as a good faith member of the community.
Now, pretending to be acting as a lawyer or judge while really pursuing
a political intention is a fairly difficult thing to do and, indeed the better
you do it, the better you translate your political intentions, point by
point, into an appropriate legal vocabulary, the less likely is your political
intention to be overseeing your professional performance, because after a
while your focus will be more on the translation than on the instrumentality it supposedly serves. Once you fall in with the spirit of a disciplinary performance and attune yourself to the discipline's constituitive aspiration (in this case the aspiration to be just or equitable), extraneous
motives will simply be crowded out, for you will be wholly occupied (in
the territorial sense) by the motives appropriate to the "home"
enterprise.
It is in this sense that the discipline of the law can be said to be autonomous, not because it exhibits a purity that insulates it from political
pressure and from change, but because the changes it may undergo will
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always leave intact (even when redefined) a sense of basic purpose, of
what it means to do a legal job of work as opposed to doing a political job
of work or a literary job of work. That is why one can say that the law is
both political and autonomous. The law is political in the sense that its
outcomes follow from contestable assumptions concerning what is basic to
its operation. The law is autonomous in the sense that two persons whose
conclusions differed in this admittedly political way would still be joined
by the fact that they were both attempting to determine what is legally
relevant.
As an example, consider two jurists who are approaching a First
Amendment problem and disagree as to whether it would be appropriate
to perform a categorical analysis or a balancing analysis. Categorical analysis is analysis which asks a taxonomic question like, "is it speech?" and
if the answer is yes, the case is over. Balancing analysis takes one additional step. Rather than stopping with the identification of the action as
speech, you take into account the harms this speech can be shown to
cause and you balance the cost of those harms against the cost of regulation. Although a categorizer and a balancer may end up in the same place,
it is more than likely that their conclusions will diverge. Nevertheless
even at the moment of divergence the two will be joined by a determination to be faithful to the First Amendment, and because of that shared
determination they will be innocent of political intentions even though
they are producing political conclusions.
The same analysis holds for the world of literary studies. Any road I go
down in the course of an interpretation of ParadiseLost 4 could be challenged by a critic who believes, and could back up his or her belief with
reasons, that the road he or she wanted to go down was the better one.
Each of us would be taking a contestable and hence political path in our
reading of ParadiseLost and yet each of us would be taking that path
with the same desire, i.e., to get at the truth about Paradise Lost. In
short, while both the methodologies we employed and the result we
reached would be political in the sense that they rested on contestable
assumptions and definitions, neither of us would be proceeding within a
political intention because we would still be committed to the same disciplinary goal. Indeed, we could only be doing our jobs if in the act of prosecuting our politically conceived projects, with the help of politically
identified materials, we nevertheless scrupulously avoided political intentions. If we did not, we would become politicians and no longer be literary
critics.
We would no longer be literary critics, for example, if instead of asking
"what is the truth about ParadiseLost?" we asked, "which interpretation
4.
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of ParadiseLost will best serve to rouse my troops on the eve of battle or
to advance my candidacy for office?" Those are possible questions and up
through the nineteenth century ParadiseLost was often used by generals
and politicians in just that way. I have no quarrel with such appropriations of literary materials so long as one understands that once the act of
appropriation occurs, the materials are no longer literary and the agent
deploying them is not engaging in literary criticism. You can only be engaged in literary criticism if your efforts (varied and contestable though
they may be) follow from a literary intention, the intention to get at the
truth about some poem or novel or play. A departure from that intention
transforms the nature of the activity even when its physical features remain the same. A critic who decides in the middle of his performance to
prosecute a political rather than a literary intention would be like a batter who decided to strike out because he knew that the pitcher was in
danger of losing his job. The criticism properly directed at him would not
be that he was playing the game badly, but that he was not playing the
game at all.
Now that we have established that the distinctiveness of a discipline
inheres in the core sense of purpose to which its members are faithful
even when they disagree about almost everything, the question still remains: what is the status of that distinctiveness, that autonomy? In general there are two answers to that question. The first answer is that the
distinctiveness is essential; that is to say, the law or literary criticism as a
practice matches up to some ideal template or model whose true home is
the mind of God, or a realm of Platonic ideas. This answer has the consequence (and advantage) of assuring that the practice itself can never perish, because, if the ideal form of law or literary criticism exists in some
abstract or theological world, the fact that mere practitioners have fallen
away from the ideal is a judgement on them and not on the ideal; and
even if the path has been lost in one generation it can be found again in
the next.
Just this position has been argued by Ernest Weinrib of the University
of Toronto, in an essay in the Yale Law Journal.s Weinrib points out that
tort law is basically about tortfeasors and sufferers and turns on the relationship between them as encoded in the vocabulary of cause and effect,
liability, restitution, fault, etc. He acknowledges that there are other ways
of conceptualizing tort law, including calculating damages according to
some external formula (need, social utility) or doing away with fault entirely and substituting for it a scheme of universal insurance. But in his
view any such scheme would be a "conceptual monstrosity" for it would
5. Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism:On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YAE LEJ.
949 (1988).
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be employing the language of tort law while eviscerating the core sense of
purpose which gives that language its intelligibility. 6 For Weinrib tort law
is what it is and has been from the beginning of time and the infidelity of
some present practitioners, while regrettable, does not in any way impair
its abstract and categorical reality.
There is, however, a second possible answer to the question, "what is
the status of disciplinary autonomy?" One could say that it is diacritical,
a fancy term that is not so fancy once you unpack it. What it means is
something like this: a discipline achieves its distinctiveness when it manages to carve out for itself a place at the table of disciplines, not by
matching up to something in the sky or in the mind of God but by elaborating a vocabulary which produces the need it then fulfills. Rather than
it being the case that there is an antecedent model or template prior to
actual practices, there are, in this view, only actual practices, which maintain their share of the franchise by ceaseless acts of self-promotion that
are also and chiefly acts of self-creation. It follows that a diacritically
achieved autonomy is an autonomy that can be lost. A practice that
ceases to elaborate and defend its internal machinery can perish, can be
crowded out at the table of practices either because it allows its vocabulary to be overwhelmed by the vocabulary of a rival or because it seeks to
discard its vocabulary on the grounds that it tends to obscure the reality
in whose service practitioners labor. (This was the "project" of Legal Realism). But if the reality authorizing a practice is constituted by that
practice and comes into view only in the light of its special labors, the
last thing you want to do is get rid of the vocabulary that gives those
labors purpose and point. If the distinctiveness and autonomy of a discipline is an earned achievement, that achievement is secure only so long as
you hold onto the discipline's jargon and make it as inaccessible to outsiders as possible.
This then is the choice: an account of disciplinary autonomy which, like
Weinrib's, insulates it from historical process, or an account which identifies historical process as the source of autonomy and also as the threat to
its survival. The choice in short is between Realism and Conventionalism,
a choice as old as the literally endless controversies it has spawned. Let's
discuss it.
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